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Abstract
We implement a lab-in-the-eld experiment with 334 Turkish loan ocers to document gen-
der discrimination in small business lending and to unpack the mechanisms at play. Each
ocer reviews multiple real-life loan applications in which we randomize the applicant's gen-
der. While unconditional approval rates are the same for male and female applicants, loan
ocers are 26 percent more likely to require a guarantor when we present the same applica-
tion as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur. A causal forest algorithm to
estimate heterogeneous treatment eects reveals that this discrimination is strongly concen-
trated among young, inexperienced, and gender-biased loan ocers. Discrimination mainly
aects female loan applicants in male-dominated industries, indicating how nancial frictions
can perpetuate entrepreneurial gender segregation across sectors.
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1 Introduction
Across the world, female entrepreneurs borrow much less from banks than male entrepreneurs
do (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2018). Whether this nancial gender gap is inecient depends
on whether it reects dierences in the demand for or the supply of loans. On the demand
side, women may select into smaller and less-capital intensive rms that require little credit
(Demirgüc-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). On the supply side, discrimination by lenders
is often cited as contributing to women's nancial exclusion (The Economist, 2013; OECD,
2016). In the latter case, female entrepreneurs face too tight credit constraints and their
productive capacity may remain underutilized. Such a misallocation of entrepreneurial talent
can in turn hamper economic growth (Hsieh et al., 2019).
Discrimination in small business lending occurs when loan ocers treat male and female
applicants dierently even if they are equal in all business-related aspects. Loan ocers may
hold female applicants to a higher standard by either directly rejecting women who do not
meet this standard or by applying onerous conditions that make credit unattainable. Such
indirect discrimination is particularly dicult to detect empirically. To test for the presence
of both direct and indirect gender discrimination in small business lending, we implement a
lab-in-the-eld experiment in which loan ocers evaluate multiple real-life loan applications
where the gender of the applicant has been (randomly) manipulated by us.1 Bringing loan
ocers into a controlled environment allows us to carefully track their decisions and to trace
the mechanisms through which gender discrimination materializes.
We conduct our experiment with 334 loan ocers of a large Turkish bank. Turkey
provides a particularly suitable setting to study gender discrimination in lending. It is a
large and growing emerging market with a competitive banking system. The country scores
well in terms of de jure gender equality: Few legal obstacles restrict women's ability to
become an entrepreneur (Klapper and Singh, 2014). At the same time, the country remains
characterized by conservative gender norms. It only ranks 130 out of 149 countries in terms
of de facto gender equality (WEF, 2018). This tension between gender-related laws on the
book and actual attitudes within society characterizes many other emerging markets too.2
1Gneezy and Imas (2017) dene a lab-in-the-eld study as one conducted in a naturalistic environment,
targeting the theoretically relevant population but using a standardized, validated lab paradigm.
2Turkey's Civil Code protects women's rights related to inheritance and marriage but contains no law that
explicitly prohibits gender discrimination in lending (like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in the U.S.).
1
We start by testing whether loan ocers discriminate directly against female applicants.
We nd no evidence for such outright discrimination. Unconditional loan approval rates
are very similar when we present the same application as coming from a male or a female
entrepreneur. We next investigate whether loan ocers discriminate in a less direct way.
We nd strong evidence that they do. In particular, loan ocers are 26 percent more likely
to make nal loan approval conditional on the presence of a guarantor when we present the
same application as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur. Because we use
real-life loan applications that our partner bank received in the recent past, we can trace
how loans performed in reality. We nd that discrimination is concentrated among loans
that were fully repaid in real life, making lending biases potentially costly to the bank.
To shed light on the mechanisms at play, we start by investigating whether biased lend-
ing is widespread across the loan ocer population or concentrated among certain types.
We rst estimate conditional average treatment eects using sample-split and fully inter-
acted regressions. We then apply machine learningWager and Athey's (2018) causal forest
estimatorto more exibly and eciently explore heterogeneous impacts. The algorithm
identies who discriminates most by predicting individual treatment eects based on loan of-
cer covariates. We nd that younger and less experienced ocers, and especially those with
stronger implicit stereotypes against entrepreneurial women (measured through an Implicit
Association Test), are more likely to impose discriminatory guarantor requirements.
We proceed by exploring two mechanisms that may underpin our results: gender dier-
ences in (actual or perceived) credit risk and loan ocers acting on biased beliefs. We nd
no evidence supporting the idea that loan ocers are concerned about higher credit risk
among female entrepreneurs. The distribution of credit scores across male and female ap-
plicants is very similar and loan ocers themselves do not perceive female entrepreneurs to
be riskier than equivalent male ones. We also nd no evidence of statistical discrimination.
Experimentally varying the borrower information that is available to loan ocers does not
inuence the gender bias in guarantor requirements.
The second mechanism concerns biased beliefs as reections of social stereotypes (Bohren,
Imas and Rosenberg, 2019; Bordalo et al., 2019). Our nding that loan ocers with stronger
implicit biases against entrepreneurial women are more likely to discriminate in terms of
guarantor requirements already suggests that stereotypes play a role. To dig deeper, we
divide our loan applications into those in relatively male-dominated versus female-dominated
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industries. We nd that in stereotypically male industries, but not in female industries, loan
approval is 15 percentage points more likely to be made conditional on a guarantor when we
present the application as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur.
We again build a causal forest to learn about treatment eect heterogeneity. The al-
gorithm helps to disentangle the role of loan ocers' implicit gender bias, age and work
experience. We nd that these moderators play distinct roles depending on whether women
apply for a loan in a traditionally male or female industry. In female-dominated industries,
individual treatment eects range between zero and 10 percentage points. The algorithm
reveals a tight negative relationship between loan ocers' age and work experience and the
predicted treatment eect. Once loan ocers reach an age of about 43 (or, equivalently,
two decades of work experience) they no longer discriminate against female applicantsthat
is, as long as applicants stick to traditionally female industries. In sharp contrast, in male-
dominated industries, age and experience do little to attenuate discrimination. Here, the
treatment eect is consistently above 10 percentage points and we nd a tight positive rela-
tionship between the strength of individual ocers' stereotypes and their predicted bias in
guarantor requirements. In sum, social stereotypes underpin biased guarantor requirements
but do so in a context-specic way.
Our results advance the literature on several fronts. First, we help to ll an important
gap in the literature on gender discrimination in entrepreneurial nance. Recent work using
administrative data (Ewens and Townsend, 2020) and experiments (Brooks et al., 2020; Hu
and Ma, 2020) documents an investor bias against female entrepreneurs in need of venture
capital. Herbert (2020), using French administrative data, shows that this equity funding
gap reverses in female-dominated industries. An experiment by Gornall and Strebulaev
(2020) nds that female entrepreneurs receive more replies to pitches to venture capitalists,
suggesting an absence of discrimination at this initial stage.
There is less work on gender discrimination in entrepreneurial lending and most of it
relies on observational data.3 Analyzing the loan portfolio of an Italian bank, Bellucci,
Borisov and Zazzaro (2010) show that women face tighter credit availability and collateral
3Two recent papers focus on discrimination in consumer lending. Dobbie et al. (2020) use administrative
data from a UK lender and nd evidence for discrimination against immigrants and older applicants (but
not women) due to an incentive scheme that biases loan ocers against illiquid applicants. Montoya et al.
(2020) randomly match stylized consumer loan requests to male and female individuals who then apply by
email for a small consumer loan. Requests submitted by women are less likely to be approved.
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requirements but not higher interest rates. Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli (2013) access the
Italian credit registry and nd that female-owned rms do pay higher rates. Women also
need to post a guarantee more often. Similar studies using administrative data from the
U.S. nd no gender discrimination.4 Lastly, Alibhai et al. (2019) conduct an email survey of
77 Turkish loan ocers in which respondents have to distribute a loan amount among four
stylized applications with randomized gender. Female applications received less funding.
We build on this work by bringing loan ocers to the lab and measuring traits that are
typically unobservableincluding implicit gender bias, risk preferences, and work experience.
Employing recent advancements in causal machine learning, we show that some of these
characteristics are rst-order determinants of biased lending. This sheds new light on work
by Beck, Behr and Guettler (2013) and Beck, Behr and Madestam (2018) who use data from
an Albanian lender. The rst paper shows that lending decisions by female loan ocers
result in fewer arrears, while the second nds that borrowers matched with opposite-sex
loan ocers pay higher interest rates. The authors of the rst paper conclude that not
only the institutional and governance structure of nancial institutions matters, but also the
gender of the people operating in a given bank structure (p. 5). Yet they acknowledge that
performance dierences between male and female loan ocers may in fact reect unobserved
characteristics. We provide evidence to this eect by measuring such characteristics and
quantifying their relative importance. Our causal forest shows that loan ocers' implicit
gender bias and their work experience is six and three times, respectively, more important
than their own gender as drivers of discriminatory guarantor requirements.
Our experimental approach also reduces some identication concerns inherent to obser-
vational studies. In particular, we need not worry about omitted variables bias since we
vary applicant gender while keeping all other characteristics of applications equal. We can
also cleanly isolate the supply side of the credit market. This is important because a lower
use of credit by female enterprises may simply reect lower demand (Ongena and Popov,
2016). Lastly, in administrative data, clients are typically not randomly matched to loan
ocers, which can bias estimates of discrimination. One way to address this is to exploit
rotation policies that generate exogenous matching between ocers and borrowers (Fisman,
4See Blanchower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003), Blanchard, Zhao and Yinger (2008) and Asiedu,
Freeman and Nti-Addae (2012). Ferguson and Peters (1995) discuss the conclusions one can and cannot
draw about discrimination on the basis of loan denial and default rates in administrative data.
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Paravisini and Vig, 2017). We instead randomly assign applications to loan ocers so that
there is no endogenous matching by construction.
A second line of work we contribute to deals with inaccurate beliefs as drivers of dis-
crimination. Economists have traditionally distinguished between taste-based and statistical
discrimination. Taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) occurs when decision makers (say,
loan ocers) are prejudiced against a group (say, women) and consciously avoid interacting
with them.5 In contrast, statistical discrimination takes place when decision makers rely on
a group attribute as a signal of unobserved individual quality. For example, loan ocers
may believe that the creditworthiness of men and women diers on average (Phelps, 1972;
Arrow, 1973) or has a dierent variance (Aigner and Cain, 1977).6 More recently, Bohren,
Imas and Rosenberg (2019) and Bohren et al. (2020) distinguish between statistical discrim-
ination based on correct versus incorrect beliefs. Statistical discrimination is inecient if it
reects inaccurate beliefs about outcome distributions (such as credit risk) across groups.
Such miscalibrated beliefs can take the form of gender stereotypes which, even if they contain
a kernel of truth (Bordalo et al., 2016), exaggerate average dierences and contribute to
gender gaps in decision making (Bordalo et al., 2019).
Recent empirical work provides evidence for inaccurate statistical discrimination in the
market for entrepreneurial equity (Hebert, 2018; Ewens and Townsend, 2020; Hu and Ma,
2020). We instead investigate biased beliefs in the market for entrepreneurial debt. Bohren
et al. (2020) suggest two methods to distinguish between dierent forms of discrimination:
collecting data on the subjective beliefs of evaluators and varying the information supplied
to them. We do both. We rst administer an Implicit Association Test to generate a direct
measure, at the level of individual loan ocers, of implicit stereotypes against entrepreneurial
women.7 Such stereotypes may be most salient in male-centric domains (Reuben, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2014). In line with this, we nd that stereotypes have the strongest impact
when women apply for a loan in a male-dominated sector. We also experimentally vary
the applicant information available to loan ocers. We nd that information availability
5Implicit discrimination is similar but takes place without individuals being aware of it (Bertrand, Chugh
and Mullainathan, 2005).
6Statistical discrimination can be especially salient when decision makers evaluate out-group individuals
(say, male loan ocers screening female entrepreneurs) because it is more dicult to interpret signals about
out-groups (Cornell and Welch, 1996).
7Attitude IATs measure implicit negative attitudes towards social groups. Stereotype IATslike the one
we usemeasure implicit associations between social groups and specic traits (Bertrand and Duo, 2017).
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does not aect lending decisions in a gender-specic way. Together, these results point to
inaccurate beliefs (in the form of implicit stereotypes against entrepreneurial women) as the
main mechanism explaining the biased guarantor requirements we document in general and
in male-dominated industries in particular.
Third, we contribute to research on the underrepresentation of women among entrepreneurs
and on gender segregation across industries. For the U.S., Gompers and Wang (2017) docu-
ment that women constitute less than 10 percent of the entrepreneurial and venture capital
labor pool while Guzman and Kacperczyk (2019) show that more than half of the gender gap
in entrepreneurial funding reects the sorting of women and men into start-ups with a dier-
ent growth orientation. The clustering of women in specic sectors also accounts for a large
part of the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2017). A separate strand of work explains
the labor-supply decisions of women and men as a function of deep-rooted social norms
about the approprivate behavior of women (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013; Giuliano,
2018; Grosjean and Khattar, 2019) and men (Baranov, De Haas and Grosjean, 2020). These
norms can transmit across generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) and lead men and women
to self-select into occupations that best match their self-perceived gender identity (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2010); to forego entrepreneurial opportunities at odds with prevailing norms
(Field, Jayachandran and Pande, 2010); and to be restricted in their choices because social
norms have been codied into discriminatory laws (Naaraayanan, 2020). Our contribution
is to connect both lines of literature by showing how social stereotypes about gender and en-
trepreneurship can generate nancial frictions in the form of biased guarantor requirements,
especially in traditionally male industries. Such frictions may then perpetuate an inecient
allocation of entrepreneurial talent across industries.
Lastly, our results add to a small literature on social collateral and third-party guarantees
in lending. A guarantor takes legal responsibility for repayment in case the borrower fails
to do so. The use of guarantors is not only widespread in emerging markets but also in
Europe and the United States where borrowers without a credit history are often asked
for a guarantor. Unlike passive collateral, guarantors actively monitor borrowers to ensure
repayment (Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994) and monitoring is often leveraged by the
threat of social sanctions (Bond and Rai, 2008). This makes guarantees particularly eective
in mitigating moral hazard (Pozzolo, 2004).8 The other side of the coin is that when a loan
8A related literature analyzes joint-liability contracts in micronance, where groups of borrowers monitor
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applicant is requested to ask a family member or friend to guarantee a loan, they put
their social capital and reputation at risk. Guarantees thus tend to come at a social or
psychological cost to the borrower. Recent experimental evidence from Vietnam shows that
borrowers are willing to pay up to nine percent of their monthly income to prevent repayment
diculties from being disclosed to their guarantor (Diep-Nguyen and Dang, 2020). We show
how implicit biases among loan ocers expose female loan applicants considerably more to
such onerous guarantor requirements than otherwise identical male applicants.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our setting and exper-
imental design. Section 3 then summarizes the data generated by the experiment, outlines
our estimation strategy, and introduces the causal forest algorithm. Section 4 presents the
results after which Section 5 discusses mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental context and design
2.1 Context
We conducted our experiment in cooperation with a large commercial bank in Turkey. Over
a two-month period, 22 experimental sessions were held with a total of 334 bank employees
across eight cities.9 The bank operates a regional oce in each of these cities and participants
were randomly selected from all bank employees involved in small business lending (which
makes up two-thirds of the bank's loan portfolio). Figure 1 shows the location of the regional
oces and the number and gender of the participating bank employees.10
Bank employees at two seniority levels participated in the experiment: loan ocers (192)
and supervisors (142). Both are located in branches and involved in the screening of borrow-
ers. Loan ocers establish contact with potential borrowers, conduct the initial screening,
and collect documentation on business performance (income statements and balance sheets).
They also check the availability of collateral and guarantors and request a credit score from
the Turkish credit registry (KKB). Loan ocers then enter this information into an elec-
each other's project choice and eort, thus reducing moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990 and Karlan, 2007).
9These were Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Izmir, and Trabzon. We also conducted
a pilot session with 32 loan ocers in Istanbul but do not use these pilot data.
10We stratied by gender, so that the participants' gender composition does not exactly reect that of the
local universe of bank employees.
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tronic application form. They can also voluntarily add subjective notes to this form, such
as about the client's perceived trustworthiness, experience, or social standing. If the loan
ocer deems a client creditworthy in principle, they pass on the electronic application form
to their supervisor (typically the branch manager) with a proposed maximum credit limit.
Crucially, at this point they also give their view as to whether a guarantor is required.
That is, loan ocers can recommend that the loan application is approved unconditionally or
made conditional on the presence of a guarantor. According to discussions with Turkish loan
ocers, the main function of requiring a guarantor is to leverage borrowers' social capital
and, in doing so, to attenuate ex ante moral hazard and reduce the probability of default.
If a borrower defaults nonetheless, banks can in principle start legal proceedings to recover
(part of) the loan from the borrower and the guarantor at the same time. In practice,
however, loss given default of guaranteed versus non-guaranteed loans tends to be similar,
also because the legal process to recover a loan is lengthy. The main mechanism through
which guarantees work is therefore to prevent borrowers from defaulting in the rst place.
The supervisor reviews the loan application and can reject or approve it. In the latter
case, the application is sent to the bank's headquarters for formal sign o.11 Henceforth we
refer to the total experimental population as either participants or loan ocers.
2.2 Experimental design
Participants evaluated two rounds of four loan applications.12 We randomly presented these
applications as coming from a female or a male entrepreneur. Participants then had to
decide whether to approve or reject each application and, in case of initial approval, whether
to request a guarantor or not. For each loan application, participants also had to provide
a subjective repayment probability between 0 and 100. We did not constrain the time
participants had to evaluate the applications. The sessions were framed as a general training
exercise and no gender-related issues were mentioned before or during the sessions.
The task closely mimicked the choices the participants make in their daily work. To
be consistent with real-life lending decisions, all loan applications were presented to the
11Branches can approve loans below a certain size threshold but in practice only 10 percent of micro loans
and 0.5 percent of loans to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are formally signed o in a branch.
Micro clients are those with an annual turnover below TRY 2.5 million (≈US$ 700k) and a credit limit below
TRY 750k (≈US$ 210k). The application process is fast, with loans typically approved within 1.5 days.
12Loan ocers made decisions on loan applications worth US$ 81.1 million in total.
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participants electronically and in the format of the standard application forms that they
normally process on their computer. The forms (henceforth called loan applications) con-
tained all the information required for determining creditworthiness of an applicant and that
was available at the time the application was processed.13
We use 100 loan applications in the experiment, selected from an initial sample of 250.
These 250 applications were a stratied random sample of all applications by existing SMEs
(that is, no start-ups) that the bank received in the three to six years before the experiment.14
Using this earlier period allows us to track what happened to each application in real life.
The strata were region, gender, rm size, and whether the application was accepted in real
life. By using applications from rst-time loan applicants, who had never before borrowed
from our partner bank, we minimize the potential inuence of soft information generated
over time. All applications were gender neutral except for the randomly assigned applicant
name. Some of the initial 250 les were eliminated because they contained references to the
applicant's gender (other than their name) or because they were incomplete.
All 100 les occur in the experimental data multiple times: Each application was on
average evaluated by 13.4 participants per round, half of the time as a female and half of
the time as a male le. This is important because it allows us to obtain a within-application
estimate of gender discrimination. Moreover, by asking participants to review both male
and female applications, we preserve external validity as no one at the bank sees only male
or female clients. We indicate the gender of each le by assigning new names, randomizing
between male ones (Ahmet, Ali, Mehmet, Mustafa) and female ones (Ayse, Emine, Fatma,
Zeynep). These names are common across Turkey and are well represented among working-
13These forms are at the heart of the decision making about whether the bank is willing to lend, what
the maximum credit exposure will be, and whether a guarantor is required. Only after this stage, do the
loan ocer and client negotiate about specic product types, such as credit lines and xed-term loans. The
maturity and pricing of individual products is also determined at this later stage. This means that during
the experiment we could collect data on willingness to lend, maximum amount granted and the need for a
guarantor, but not on the interest rate or maturity of specic credit products.
14When participants evaluated the les, they did not see the real application date but a date in the year of
the experiment. We did so to avoid recall biasloan ocers did not have to think back about the economic
situation in the past. This of course introduced a slight disconnect between loan performance in real life and
the application evaluated during the experiment. To check whether this disconnect matters empirically, we
regress our outcomes (loan rejection or guarantor requirement) on the dierence between the loan application
date and the time of the experiment, interacted with applicant gender. These interaction eects are never
signicant, indicating that the small timing dierence does not have any gender-specic impact.
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age adults across regions.15 No one saw the same le or the same name more than once.
We held constant the ratio of performing, non-performing and rejected les that each
participant saw, at 2-1-1. This 2-1-1 ratio does not reect the bank's actual application
ow, but we used this ratio so that participants evaluated at least one le of each type in
each round of decision making. Names were randomized such that each participant saw one
performing loan and one bad loan application (either a non-performing loan or a declined
application) from each gender.16
After the rst round, ocers received another four applications. We again randomized
the gender of each. Inspired by Bernstein, Korteweg and Laws (2017), who measure the
impact of dierent types of information on investors' decision to fund start-ups, we now also
experimentally vary the information available to loan ocers. Ocers were randomized into
one of three groups. A control group evaluated applications with all information available
(as in the rst round). A rst treatment group evaluated les from which we had deleted the
credit score from Turkey's credit bureau. This score aggregates hard nancial data that may
help to predict default. A second treatment group evaluated les where we had removed
a section with subjective information. This section contains voluntary comments by loan
ocers about the applicant (such as about how industrious they are or whether they have a
good business network). Bank sta provide this information to strengthen the rationale for
lending. The availability of nonstandard, subjective and less quantiable information may
be most important when evaluating lower-quality borrowers (Iyer et al., 2016).
If either the objective credit score or the subjective comments section contribute to o-
cers' ability to make fair and objective lending decisions, omitting it may increase statistical
discrimination. On the other hand, if the information itself is perceived with bias, omitting
it may potentially reduce discrimination. In the rst (second) case, we should see that bias
is higher (lower) in the treatment groups than in the control group.
For the second round, we opted for a within-le (in terms of gender randomization) and
15We checked which names had the highest frequencies in the relevant cohorts and across
regions using information from the Turkish General Directorate of Population and Citizen-
ship Aairs (https://www.nvi.gov.tr/isim-istatistikleri) and an additional online data source
(https://www.isimarsivi.com/). When we include name xed eects in our regressions, we fail to
reject the null that these eects are jointly equal to zero.
16That is, analogous to Bertrand and Mullainathan's (2004) correspondent study on racial discrimination,
we crossed applicant gender with application quality. Due to time constraints participants could not evaluate
more than four les and we wanted to ensure the data could be analyzed by application quality.
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between-participant (in terms of the information treatment) experimental design for two
reasons. First, we wanted to avoid non-linear or heterogeneous order eects. Non-linear
order eects are dicult to control for, while controlling for heterogeneous order eects
would require a larger participant pool than we had. Second, subjecting all participants to
all treatments would have required each participant to complete 12 reviews, and there was
not enough time for that.
We incentivized all lending decisions in line with common bank incentive schemes. Partic-
ipants earned ten points (equivalent to ten Turkish lira) for each completed review (quantity)
and an additional ve points when they correctly approved a loan that performed well in
real life (quality).17 In contrast, ve points were deducted when they incorrectly accepted a
loan that was defaulted on in real life. When participants approved a le that had been de-
clined in real life, we gave them a 50/50 chance that the le was counted as performing, thus
yielding the extra ve points. We did not penalize incorrect rejections in order to mimic as
closely as possible the actual incentive scheme at the bank, and the bank cannot realistically
know when a rejection is incorrect.
We aggregated all points per participant at the end of each experimental session and
participants then exchanged points for prizes. Participants were ranked according to their
score and split into four quartiles. In line with our instructions at the start of the session,
those in the highest quartile could spend their points on higher valued prizes while those in
the lower quartiles had to select gifts with lower values. All participants had chosen their
preferred prizes from each category prior to the experiment. This ensured they understood
how the incentives worked and what the benet would be of getting into the top quartiles.18
The incentive scheme was thus both material and competitive.
2.3 Eliciting personality traits
After both rounds of application decisions, we measured participants' risk preferences and
implicit gender bias. We follow Binswanger (1982) and Eckel and Grossman (2008) and
17This incentive scheme resembles the remuneration system that the bank uses in reality and is also
similar to the baseline scheme of Cole, Kanz and Klapper (2015). The incentives allow us to mimic the
costs associated with certain forms of discrimination and contrasts with existing experimental work, which
typically does not impose costs for making inecient discriminatory choices (Neumark, 2018).
18Specimens of the prizes that participants could buy were on display during the sessions. The prizes were
sent to the participants a few weeks later.
11
elicit risk preferences by presenting participants with six risk scenarios from which they had
to choose one. Each scenario was depicted as a circle split in two. Each half contained
a possible outcome, in points, and the even split represented that the two outcomes were
equally likely. The outcome pairs were 28-28; 20-44; 24-36; 16-52; 12-60; and 2-70. The task
was incentivized: an on-site computer drew random draws to determine whether participants
would get the low or high number from the circle they selected.
Participants also took a stereotype Implicit Association Test (IAT).19 They had to sort,
as quickly as possible, words that appeared sequentially on their tablet by clicking buttons
at the right and left of the screen. The IAT started with two practice rounds in which
participants sorted career words into a career bucket (left) and family words into a
family bucket (right). This was repeated for male and female words.20 After these practice
rounds, the IAT mixed gender words and career/family words. Male and career words now
shared a sorting button while female and family words shared the button on the other
side of the screen (the stereotypical task). This was followed by another task where male
and family words shared a sorting button while female and career words shared the other
button (the non-stereotypical task). We recorded the time it took to sort each word in
milliseconds. The assumption is that respondents with a stronger association between two
concepts nd sorting easier and complete it faster in one task compared to the other. We
dene a participant's implicit stereotype against entrepreneurial women as the normalized
dierence in mean response times between the non-stereotypical and the stereotypical task.
Higher values indicate stronger stereotypes.
19IATs are now common in psychology (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz, 1998) and economics (Bertrand,
Chugh and Mullainathan, 2005; Beaman et al., 2009; Glover, Pallais and Parienté, 2017; Carlana, 2019).
A meta-analysis found an average correlation of 0.24 between the IAT score and outcome measures such as
judgments, choices, and physiological responses (Greenwald et al., 2009).
20The IAT and all other documentation was provided in Turkish. The family-related words were transla-
tions for words such as kitchen, marriage, and laundry. Career words included oce, manager, and
job. To designate male we used words like man, boy, and gentleman and for female words we used
words such as woman, girl, and lady.
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3 Data and estimation strategy
3.1 Data
Table 1 summarizes our experimental data (Appendix Table A1 contains all variable deni-
tions). Panel A describes the main characteristics of the 334 participants. Almost half of
them are female and their average age is 37 years, ranging between 26 and 53. Forty-three
percent of the participants are supervisors, the others are loan ocers. While the average
participant has worked as a loan ocer for almost nine years, this varies between zero and
32 years. There is thus substantial variation in the lending experience that loan ocers have
built up over the course of their career.21
Our lab-in-the-eld experiment allows us to measure participant characteristics that are
otherwise dicult to observe. As described in Section 2.3, we use lottery questions to elicit
risk aversion and an IAT to gauge participants' implicit bias against women in business.
Table 1 reveals substantial variation in these measures. The categorical variable Participant
risk aversion ranges between 1 (risk loving) and 6 (most risk averse). The average participant
scores 4.1. A large literature has documented that, on average, women tend to be more risk
averse than men (for example Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Evidence from the nancial
services industry indicates that female decision makers take less risk on average (Sunden
and Surette, 1998; Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden, 2003). The correlation matrix in Appendix
Table A2 shows that this is the case in our setting as well. The average risk aversion score
is 4.32 for females and 3.92 for males.
The IAT score is transformed so that it ranges between -1 and 1 with zero indicating
no implicit gender bias. While the scores vary widely, a large majority of lending sta (87
per cent) has a positive IAT score, indicating that they subconsciously associate business
more with men than with women. This tendency is stronger among women than among
men (Figure 2). A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conrms that the distributions
are signicantly dierent (see also Appendix Table A2). The average IAT score is 0.39 for
women and 0.28 for men and this dierence is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the real-life characteristics of the 100 loan les that we
21We also asked participants for how long they had worked at this particular bank. The average employ-
ment duration was ve years and ranged between zero and 19 years. All results that follow are robust to
using this narrower experience denition.
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use in the experiment. By design, half of these les refer to loans that in real life were paid
back on time (performing loans), a quarter refers to loans that in real-life were defaulted
upon (non-performing loans), and another quarter consists of loan applications that were
rejected in real life (declined applications). Panel C summarizes the experimental outcomes
at the participant-le decision level. We show separate statistics for round 1 (no information
treatment) and round 2 (information treatments). In both rounds, almost forty percent of
the loan applications is rejected outright whereas, conditional on provisional acceptance, a
guarantor is requested in 27 percent of the cases.
For each credit application, the participant was asked to estimate, on a 0-100 scale, the
probability that the borrower would repay. The median estimated repayment probability
is 70 percent (Table 1). These data also help us to verify that the experimental task was
meaningful in the sense that loan ocers could infer credit risk based on the information in
the loan le. Figure 3 provides a scatterplot of the 100 les used in the experiment, based on
data from the rst round only. The horizontal axis indicates the average subjective repayment
probability (each le was evaluated by 13.4 participants on average in round 1) while the
vertical axis shows the share of participants that rejected the application. Figure 3 reveals a
tight negative correlation between expected repayment probability and the likelihood of loan
rejection. This suggests that our incentive scheme worked and that participants thought the
task realistic and paid attention to the information provided.
Equally important is whether the decision making in our lab-in-the-eld correlates with
what happened to loan applications in real life. We nd that this is the case. Overall,
72 percent of all applications that resulted in loans that performed well in real life were
approved during the experiment. This percentage is signicantly lower for applications that
resulted in non-performing loans (53 percent) and for applications that were rejected in
real life (47 percent). As a result, les that in real life were non-performing (gray dots) or
declined (white) are concentrated in the upper-left corner of Figure 3 while performing loans
(black) are concentrated in the lower right-hand corner. This indicates that across the board
participants correctly identied loans that performed well or badly in real life and made
decisions in line with these subjective perceptions of loan quality.
Appendix Table A2 provides a correlation matrix of the participant characteristics and
the rejection dummy. We already discussed that female participants are on average more
risk averse and more implicitly gender biased. Table A2 also shows that participants higher
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up in the lending hierarchy (supervisors) are more often female, older and more experienced,
as well as more gender biased. Lastly, it is reassuring that whether a le was presented as
male or female (Female applicant) is completely uncorrelated with any of the participant
characteristics. This reects that the randomization was successful.
Appendix Table A3 assesses the correlates of implicit gender bias in a multivariate setting.
When we horse race the participant characteristics in this way, participants' own gender is
the main variable that explains implicit gender bias. Even when controlling for a participant's
experience, age, hierarchical position, and risk aversion, we continue to nd that female
bank employees are on average 0.11 points (on the [-1,1] scale) more biased against female
entrepreneurs as compared with male bank employees.
3.2 Estimation strategy
To test for biased lending behavior of loan ocers, we regress the loan application outcomes
of interest on Gil, the randomly assigned applicant gender of loan application l as seen by
participant i. We start with a parsimonious linear probability model with loan application
(le) xed eects, ϕl, to obtain within-le estimates of gender discrimination:
yil = α + β ·Gil + ϕl + εil (1)
where yil is the lending outcome of interest when participant i evaluates loan application
l. Standard errors, εil, are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the participant level.
Due to the experimental design, applicant gender is the only loan application characteris-
tic that (randomly) varies across decisions about the same application. The loan application
(le) xed eects thus absorb all observed and unobserved le characteristics aside from
applicant gender. Unobservables here include all (combinations of) features of the written
loan applications that the econometrician might ignore but that loan ocers consciously or
unconsciously care about. In this sense the experimental design and associated analytical
specication provide stronger identication compared with observational studies where the
data do not allow for within-le estimates.
We then run progressively more saturated specications to further improve the eciency
of the estimates and add structure to the error term.22 We rst add stratication con-
22While randomization ensures our estimate of β is unbiased, adding covariates can improve precision.
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trols: a dummy variable for whether a participant is a supervisor or loan ocer (Participant
is supervisor) and xed eects for the cities where the bank's regional oces are based
(and where the experimental sessions took place). Next, we include additional participant
characteristics and, in the most saturated specication, individual-specic random eects.
Individual eects control for participant-level unobserved heterogeneity. The use of random
eects is appropriate here because the matching between les and participants was random
and all participants evaluated the same proportion of male and female applications, of both
high and low quality. Also, because participants were randomly selected from the total loan
ocer population, any individual specic eects are the result of a random draw and orthog-
onal to the treatment variable, Gil. Individual heterogeneity is therefore not systematically
correlated with Gil and random eects will be unbiased and ecient.
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The most restrictive model that we estimate thus includes a vector of K participant
characteristics (gender, experience, age, a supervisor dummy, risk aversion, and IAT score),
Xi; le xed eects, ϕl; a set of xed eects for the eight cities where the experiment took
place, ϕc; and participant random eects, ηi.
yil = α + β ·Gil +
K∑
k=1
γk ·Xi + ϕl + ϕc + ηi + εil (2)
α is a constant and εil is a cluster robust error term.
3.3 Heterogeneous treatment eects
Equation 2 provides estimates of the Averate Treatment Eect (ATE). We are also interested
in conditional average treatment eects (CATE) for subgroups of the loan ocer population.
In particular, we want to assess heterogeneity by loan ocers' gender; work experience;
age; position (loan ocer versus supervisor); risk aversion; and their implicit bias against
entrepreneurial women. We follow two approaches. First, we present traditional sample-split
regressions where we estimate Equation (2) on subsamples (the Appendix also summarizes
equivalent fully interacted regression models).
Second, we use supervised machine learning in the form of an honest causal forest algo-
rithm to assess how impacts vary across loan ocers (Athey and Imbens, 2016; Wager and
23Using participant xed eects is an alternative that would entail an unnecessary loss of eciency.
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Athey, 2018; Athey et al., 2019). This has two important advantages (Davis and Heller,
2017). First, causal forests can combine multiple explanatory variables in a data-driven,
nonlinear but disciplined way. This gives us a more ecient, and hence statistically more
powerful, tool to estimate heterogeneous treatment eects. In a setting like ours, with multi-
ple dimensions of potential heterogeneity (which may also interact or have non-linear eects)
and subpopulations that dier in size, this is especially useful. Second, the algorithm tells us
how useful each loan ocer trait is in growing the forest from which heterogeneous impacts
are predicted. This allows us to gauge the relative importance of these traits as moderators
of the causal eect between applicant gender and outcomes. Moreover, we can plot the value
of these traits against the predicted treatment eect at the level of individual ocers because
the algorithm provides us with a complete distribution of these eects.
Conceptually, the honest causal forest algorithm creates a random forest of causal trees.
Each tree grows from a random (bootstrapped) subsample of training data, the root node.
The tree then recursively splits into increasingly smaller nodes that share similar covariates
until it arrives at a set of terminal nodes (called leaves). The algorithm makes splits that
produce the biggest dierence in treatment eects across leaves while still yielding an accurate
estimate of the full treatment eect.24 If splitting a node would not result in an improved
t, that node is not split further and forms a nal leaf. This approach is honest in the sense
that for each training subsample (that is, for each tree) the observations are separated into
a splitting sample (to determine where to place the splits) and an estimating sample (to
estimate the within-leaf treatment eects).
We use the generalized random forest grf package for R by Tibshirani et al. (2020) to
estimate a forest with 20,000 trees based on a random training sample of 70 percent of the
full dataset. To grow each tree, we split the training sample into a splitting and estimating
sample of equal size. This step is repeated 20,000 times to grow the complete forest. In a
nal step, the 30 percent of the full dataset that was left aside is fed through all trees. For
each observation, we determine to which leaf it belongs based on the loan ocer's various
traits. We then assign it the predicted treatment eect of that particular leaf. The average
prediction across all trees is then the predicted treatment eect at the loan ocer level.
24A regular random forest determines the splitting by minimizing the mean squared error of the outcome.
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4 Results
4.1 Applicant gender and the rejection of loan applications
Table 2 presents linear probability regressions based on Equations 1 and 2. The dependent
variable is a Rejection dummy, which is 1 if an application was outright rejected by a
participant and 0 if approved. The independent variable of interest, Female applicant,
is a dummy whether the application was presented as coming from a female (1) or male
(0) entrepreneur. Column 1 shows the most parsimonious specication with only le xed
eects. Column 2 adds stratication controls while column 3 also includes the participant
characteristics Participant is female; Participant experience; and Participant age. Column 4
then adds two potentially important, but typically unobserved, variables that we measured
in the laboratory: risk aversion and implicit bias against entrepreneurial women. Finally, we
add individual random eects in column 5. All data are from the rst experimental round.25
Table 2 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no signicant treatment eect
of Female applicant on loan rejection. Across the ve specications, the coecient for Female
applicant is close to zero and, if anything, negative.26 Since we include le xed eects, our
results show that the same loan application does not have a higher chance of being outright
rejected when we present it with a woman's name rather than a man's name. In short, we
nd no evidence of direct gender discrimination.
Before turning to the participant covariates, we stress that applicant gender is the only
variable that we manipulated experimentally and that hence can be interpreted causally.
With this caveat in mind, we nd that supervisors are nine percentage points less likely to
accept a loan application as compared with regular loan ocers. This dierence, signicant
at the 1 percent statistical level, is large: the unconditional acceptance rate in our experiment
is 61 percent. It likely reects that the main role of supervisors is to validate (or overrule)
the initial lending decisions by more junior loan ocers.27 We do not nd that participants'
25All results also hold when we combine the observations from the rst round with those from the control
group of the second round (in which we did not delete any information).
26Our experiment was not powered to detect such a small eect and the 95 percent condence interval
is therefore quite wide at [-0.055, 0.040]. To achieve 80 percent power to detect whether β = −0.008 is
statistically non-zero would have required over 10,000 decisionsten times our current sample.
27Unreported results show that this conservatism among supervisors is independent of the (randomized)
gender of the applicant. The interaction between Female applicant and Participant is supervisor is never
statistically signicant. The same holds when we run separate split-sample regressions for loan ocers and
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risk aversion or their implicit gender bias correlate with the rejection probability.
We also assess whether the null result applies to various sub-groups. We cut the data in
six waysby participant gender; above/below median experience; above/below median age;
supervisors versus loan ocers; above/below median risk aversion; and above/below median
implicit gender biasand run sample-split regressions (unreported). There is no evidence of
direct gender discrimination in any of these sample splits.28
4.2 Applicant gender and guarantor requirements
We next test for a more indirect form of discrimination against female applicants. In par-
ticular, in Table 3 we assess whether the approval of a loan application is more likely to be
made conditional on the presence of a guarantor when the application comes from a woman
instead of a man, all else equal. The structure mirrors Table 2 but the sample is smaller as
the decision to require a guarantor is conditional on provisional loan approval.29
We nd strong evidence of indirect gender discrimination: loan ocers are more than
six percentage points more likely to make nal loan approval conditional on the presence
of a guarantor when the application is shown as coming from a female instead of a male
entrepreneur. The statistical as well as economic signicance of this eect is stable across
the increasingly saturated specications. The eect is also substantial as only 27 percent
of all pre-approved applications are required to have a guarantor. This more indirect form
of discrimination implies that female entrepreneurs without access to a guarantor remain
deprived of credit, even if the loan ocer in principle expresses a favorable view of the
application. To the extent that such female entrepreneurs are, in fact, good credit risks such
a bias will also be disadvantageous to the bank. And even for female borrowers who are able
to provide a guarantor, putting their social capital at risk comes at a cost.
We next assess the stability of these estimates across geographies and sectors. Panel A
of Appendix Figure A1 depicts coecient estimates similar to those in column 5 of Table 3.
supervisors.
28Results are the same when we run interaction regressions rather than sample-split regressions. Note that
while a causal interpretation of the covariate coecients themselves is problematic, the results of sample-
split regressions based on those covariates, or of regressions where Female applicant is interacted with these
covariates, can be interpreted as conditional average treatment eects.
2998 percent of the participants occur in both rejection and guarantor estimations so the second regression
does not suer from a notable self-selection problem.
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Each estimate reects a sample in which we drop all observations from one city where an
experimental session took place (and where the participating loan ocers are based). This
visualizes whether the results are stable across the experimental locations. We nd that in
all cases the coecient indicates a 5 to 10 percentage point higher likelihood that a guarantor
is requested from female applicants. The coecients are ordered, from top to bottom, by
decreasing average disposable household income in the excluded city. There is no apparent
relationship between indirect gender discrimination and local economic development.
Panel B of Figure A1 repeats this exercise but now takes the perspective of the region
of the loan application. For each of the 100 les in the experiment we determine in which
region the real-life loan applicant was based.30 We then drop one region at a time and
plot the estimated coecients, ordering them from the highest (top) to the lowest (bottom)
regional income level per capita in 2016. We again nd little geographic heterogeneity:
in each case the probability that a guarantor is required is between 5 and 10 percentage
points higher when we present the same application as coming from a female rather than a
male entrepreneur. Lastly, in Panel C of Figure A1, we exclude one of the following macro
sectors at a time: Retail, services, manufacturing, wholesale, and other industries. The
results again show a coecient that lies between 5 and 10 percentage points, with a slightly
lower coecient when we exclude the retail sector. We now assess whether biased guarantor
requirements occur in the loan ocer population as a whole or are instead concentrated
among particular types of loan ocers.
4.3 Indirect gender discrimination: Participant heterogeneity
4.3.1 Heterogeneous treatment eects: Sample splits
Table 4 investigates heterogeneity in biased guarantor requirements through the lens of
sample-split regressions. We focus on the coecient for Female applicant but all regressions
include the same covariates, xed eects, and random eects as column 5 of Table 3.31 We
nd a consistent and intuitive pattern of signicant conditional average treatment eects.
30Turkey is divided into the following regions: Marmara, Aegean, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Black
Sea, Eastern Anatolia, and Southeastern Anatolia.
31When we partition non-binary variables, the below-median sample contains values strictly below the me-
dian while the above-median sample contains values at the median and above. All results remain unchanged
when we instead allocate at-the-median observations to the below-median group.
20
When we present the application as coming from a woman instead of a man, ocers are more
likely to ask for a guarantor when they are younger (columns 5-6); in a more junior position
(columns 7-8); and/or display more implicit gender bias in our IAT (columns 11-12). T-tests
conrm that we can reject equality of coecients in these column pairs.32 There is also some
evidence that participants with a below-median level of lending experience are more likely to
ask women (as compared with men) for a guarantor than their more experienced colleagues
(columns 3-4). Together these results suggest that age and seniority, possibly summarized
by experience, reduce the extent to which loan ocers use gender as a mental shortcut to
determine whether a loan application requires a guarantor or not.
Importantly, columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show no dierence between male and female
participants in how they treat female applicants. This holds independently of whether we
control for other participant characteristics or not. There is also no signicant dierence
between participants with higher versus lower levels of risk aversion, a characteristic strongly
correlated with participant gender (columns 9 and 10). We instead nd an important role
for the implicit stereotypes about entrepreneurial women that participants (both men and
women) harbor. Columns 11 and 12 show that loan ocers with above-median levels of
implicit gender bias are nine percentage points more likely to request a guarantor when we
present a le as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur.33
The applications that loan ocers reviewed during the experiment were real applications
that had been processed by the bank in the recent past. We therefore know what happened
to these applications: whether they were rejected or approved and, if approved, whether
the loans were repaid or not. We now ask whether the higher probability that female loan
applicants are required to have a guarantor is driven by loans that performed well in real life
or by those that did less well. Figure 4 gives a non-parametric answer to this question. We
divide all loan applications into those that were accepted in real life and performed well (dark
32We summarize results from equivalent fully interacted regression models in Appendix Figure A2. The
independent variables include the Female applicant dummy, an interaction between this dummy and a par-
ticipant characteristic (such as Participant experience), and a full set of additional interaction terms between
this participant characteristic and all other controls, including the le and city xed eects. The bars show
the coecients for the Female applicant dummy and the interaction of this dummy with the respective
participant characteristic. The black dots indicate the sum of these two coecients.
33A few (42) loan ocers display a negative gender bias, meaning that they associate womenrather than
menwith a career. In line with symmetric interaction eects, we nd that these ocers are less likely to
request a guarantor when we present an application as coming from a woman.
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gray bars), those that were accepted and became non-performing (medium gray), and those
that were declined in real life (light gray). The data pattern is striking. When we present
les as coming from male loan applicants (left-hand side), loan ocers clearly and strongly
dierentiate between high-quality and lower-quality loans. For loans that were repaid in
real life, men are asked for a guarantor in only 20.1 percent of the cases. This number is
substantially higher for non-performing loans and applications that were declined in real life,
at 28.6 and 32.9 percent respectively (these percentages are statistically dierent from that
for performing loans with p=0.10 and p=0.02, respectively).
When we instead present the same les as coming from female loan applicants (right-hand
side), the higher-quality loan applications do not benet from lower guarantor requirements
at all. It appears that women are held to a higher standard: even in the case of high-quality
loan applications, there is still a 30 percent likelihood that a guarantor is requested. This is
about the same percentage as for low-quality applications from male applicants. The data
therefore show that it is among the better-quality loans that ocers discriminate between
male and female applicants in terms of guarantor requirements. A similar picture emerges
when we split the sample into applicants with an above or below median subjective repayment
probability (Appendix Figure A3, Panel A) or when we split the sample into applicants with
low, median, or high ex ante credit risk as measured by their KKB credit score (Figure A4,
Panel B). In both cases, the gender bias in terms of requested guarantors is concentrated
among applications with less ex ante credit risk.
In Table 5, we perform this analysis parametrically. Column 1 conrms that even when
we control for loan ocer covariates and random eects, as well as le and city xed eects,
women are 10.7 percentage points more likely to be asked for a guarantor in case of high-
quality loans (column 1). This dierence is absent for loans that were either rejected or non-
performing in real life (column 2). The bias that ocers display when requesting guarantors
is therefore not driven by the low-quality segment of the application pool. Instead, double
standards are applied in the case of relatively good loans that were paid back in real life.
We again assess which participant types are responsible for this gender discrimination.
Columns 3 to 14 reveal similar heterogeneity as before. High-quality female loan applications
are 10 to 16 percentage points more likely to be asked for a guarantor compared to identical
male applications if the participant is relatively inexperienced (columns 5-6); relatively young
(columns 7-8); a loan ocer rather than a supervisor (columns 9-10) and revealed strong
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gender stereotypes in our implicit association test (columns 13-14).34 In summary, especially
more junior and more biased loan ocers tend to resort to the applicant's gender as a heuristic
when there are no clear indications that a loan is risky.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous treatment eects: Honest causal forests
The previous sub-section provided a rst analysis of conditional average treatment eects.
While the results form a consistent pattern, applying linear regressions to split samples limits
statistical power, especially when covariates such as age and experience are strongly (though
far from perfectly) correlated. We now introduce a causal forest algorithm to more exibly
and eciently disentangle how loan ocer traits play distinct moderating roles in the causal
relationship between applicant gender and guarantor requirements.
Figure 5 (Panel A) depicts the distribution of the predicted treatment eects. In the
absence of treatment heterogeneity, this distribution would cluster tightly around the average
treatment eect (ATE) of 6 percentage points (vertical dashed line). Instead the causal
forest reveals a broad distribution of treatment eects underlying the ATE. They vary from
slightly negative to a 13 percentage points higher probability of requesting a guarantor when
we present a loan application as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur.
Panel B of Figure 5 ranks loan ocer traits by their relative importance as moderators
(drivers of treatment heterogeneity). We dene a trait's relative importance as the weighted
sum of the number of times it is used to split at each depth in the forest. The more a trait
is used to split subsamples, the more predictive power it has. We nd that loan ocers'
implicit stereotypes against entrepreneurial women, measured as their IAT score, are by far
the most important driver of treatment heterogeneity. In fact, in exactly a third of all trees
the algorithm picks an ocer's implicit bias to make the rst split. The second and third
most important drivers are loan ocer age and experience, which our algorithmunlike
linear regressionscan neatly disentangle. The three other traitsrisk aversion, gender,
and hierarchical positionare much less important drivers of treatment heterogeneity. Most
of these results are consistent with those based on split-sample regressions. Both show that
implicit stereotypes, age, and experience are important and they both tell us that loan
34There is again no dierence by participant gender: the coecients in columns 3 and 4 are very similar.
We note that where the sub-sample coecients dier substantially in size, this dierence is in some cases
less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample (performing loans only). This is reected in the t-test
p-values at the bottom of Table 5.
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ocers' own gender is not an important driver of discriminatory guarantor requirements.
An interesting exception is Participant is supervisor. Linear sample-split regressions suggest
this variable correlates strongly with bias in guarantor requirements. Yet, the causal forest
tells us this is not the case once we account for non-linearities and the fact that being a
supervisor correlates with age and work experience.
Figure 6 plots the predicted treatment eects against the three most important loan
ocer traits. We t smooth local polynomial functions in each scatterplot. The patterns are
striking. Panel A shows how the predicted treatment eect increases when ocers' implicit
stereotypes are stronger. The causal forest reveals a discrete jump of 2.5 percentage points in
the predicted treatment eect (that is, a higher probability of requiring a guarantor when we
present a loan application as coming from a female instead of a male entrepreneur) at an IAT
score of around 0.25. From a policy perspective, this indicates that there is a distinct group
of biased loan ocers that may be targeted by, for example, debiasing interventions. Panels
B and C of Figure 6 show a tight negative correlation between age and work experience,
respectively, and the predicted treatment eect. This relationship is much more linear: The
probability that a loan ocer engages in discriminatory guarantor requirements declines
steadily with age and, independently, with work experience.35
5 Interpretation and mechanisms
When we present one and the same le as coming from a female instead of a male en-
trepreneur, loan ocers are on average six percentage points (or 26 percent) more likely to
require a guarantor. This biased behavior is concentrated among younger and less experi-
enced loan ocers and especially among those who harbor a stronger bias against female
entrepreneurs. We now consider two mechanisms that may underpin this result: gender dif-
ferences in credit risk and loan ocers using mental shortcuts that reect gender stereotypes.
35Unreported results indicate very similar patterns when we grow and use the causal forest on the basis
of only those loans that performed well in real life.
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5.1 Gender dierences in credit risk
We rst investigate whether gender dierences in credit risk could justify a dierent treat-
ment of male and female loan applications. We oer several pieces of evidence that con-
sistently show that the distribution of credit risk across male and female borrowers is very
similar and, importantly, that loan ocers themselves do in fact not judge female borrowers
to be riskier than equivalent male ones.
5.1.1 Gender dierences in credit scores
We rst compare the credit scores (from the Turkish credit registry) of the male and female
applicants in our random sample of 250 loan applications. Recall that these were sampled
from all applications the bank received from entrepreneurs in recent years. The score captures
an entrepreneur's borrowing and repayment history and is therefore a good indicator of credit
risk. The data reect the real-life applications and the actual gender of the applicant, so
they are non-experimental. Since the sample is stratied by gender, rm size, region and
quality of the original application, the distributions can be compared. The average score is
1,035 for men and 1,023 for women (a higher score implies less risk) and this small dierence
is not statistically signicant (p=0.80). Appendix Table A4 presents OLS regressions for the
243 les for which credit scores were available (the dependent variable). The rst column
conrms there is no signicant dierence between female and male applicants. This holds
when we include sector xed eects (column 2) or sector and region xed eects (column 3)
and when we control for rm size (column 4) and the amount requested (column 5). Figure 7
shows that the full distribution of these credit scores is also very similar for male and female
loan applicants (as conrmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
5.1.2 Gender dierences in subjective repayment probabilities
Even if the distribution of ex ante credit risk is objectively very similar, loan ocers may
still perceive women to be riskier (and hence be more demanding in terms of guarantor
requirements). To see whether this is the case, Figure 8 shows a binned scatter plot of
credit scores (horizontal axis) and loan ocers' view of an applicant's repayment probability
(vertical axis). Dark gray dots (light gray diamonds) show bin averages for loan applications
presented as coming from male (female) entrepreneurs. Condence intervals (95 percent) are
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based on a cubic regression spline of subjective repayment probability on the credit score.
Two main messages emerge. First, we observe a tight correlation between credit score
and subjective repayment probability along the risk distribution. That is, when loan o-
cers assess lower risk applications (higher credit scores), they systematically perceive these
applications to have a higher repayment probability. Second, this tight correlation between
objective and subjective credit risk holds independently of whether we present a le as com-
ing from a male or a female entrepreneur. This holds true along the risk distribution: At
no point is there a statistically signicant disconnect between how loan ocers translate
male versus female credit risk into subjective repayment probabilities. This is further cor-
roborated by Figure 9 and Appendix Table A5. Figure 9 provides a Kernel density plot
of the subjective repayment probability that loan ocers assign to male and to female ver-
sions of the same applications. Both distributions are very similar, as conrmed by a formal
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Appendix Table A5 displays regression specications similar to
those in Tables 2 and 3 but with Subjective repayment probability as the dependent variable.
As expected, there is no signicant impact of the (randomized) gender of the loan applicant
on the credit risk as perceived by loan ocers themselves.
5.1.3 Gender and risk: Evidence from a separate risk module
Next, we present evidence from a separate risk module that we implemented during the
experimental sessions. As part of this module, loan ocers were randomly matched with a
male or a female (real-life) entrepreneur. We informed the ocers about the gender, age, and
industrial sector of the entrepreneur they had been matched with. Prior to the experimental
sessions, we had asked these entrepreneurs to pick one out of six projects that were increasing
in riskiness, in the spirit of Eckel and Grossman (2008). They had to do so for a project
nanced with a loan and for a project nanced without debt. During the experiment, loan
ocers were then asked to guess which risky projects their matched entrepreneur had chosen.
We paid loan ocers if they chose correctly.
The ordered probit specications in Appendix Table A6 regress the participants' per-
ceptions of their matched entrepreneur's risk taking (on a 1-6 scale) on the gender of the
entrepreneur. We control for the entrepreneur's age and industrial sector. For projects not
funded with bank credit (column 1), loan ocers believe that the entrepreneur they were
matched with picked a slightly less risky project if that entrepreneur was female. The sta-
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tistical signicance of this gender dierence disappears, however, when we ask loan ocers
about the risk they think entrepreneurs took for projects nanced with bank credit (column
2). In either case, the evidence from this risk module is clearly at odds with loan ocers
perceiving female entrepreneurs to be more risky.
5.1.4 Gender, applicant information, and statistical discrimination
We next consider the decisions made during the second round of the experiment, when we
also randomized the types of applicant information that loan ocers had access to. Even
when ocers do not perceive female entrepreneurs to be more risky on average, they may
still nd it more dicult to judge applications from individual women. They may, for
example, encounter relatively few such applications and hence be less sure of the complete
risk distribution among entrepreneurial women. This makes it more dicult to interpret
signals about the quality of individuals. Rational loan ocers may then put less weight on
traits of individual female applicants (which to them are weaker signals of creditworthiness)
and more weight on group means (Aigner and Cain, 1977).
To investigate whether such statistical discrimination can explain the results from the rst
round of our experiment, we randomly varied the types of applicant information that loan
ocers had access to in the second round. Reducing the richness of applicant characteristics,
can make statistical discrimination more pronounced (Kaas and Manger, 2012; Neumark,
2018). Table 6 assesses whether restricting the information available to loan ocers has
a disproportionate impact on female loan applications. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), we
present linear probability regressions where the dependent variable is our Rejection dummy
(Guarantor dummy). In specications 1 and 3, we include dummy variables that indicate
whether in a particular decision we randomly withheld subjective (No subj.) or objective
(No. obj.) loan application information. The former refers to subjective information that
had been voluntarily entered by loan ocers (in real life) at the earliest stage of client contact.
The latter is the credit score from the Turkish credit registry. All specications include our
standard participant covariates, le and city xed eects, and participant random eects.
We nd no evidence of statistical gender discrimination. The interaction terms between
Female loan applicant and the information treatments are far from statistically signicant in
columns 2 and 4. Column 2 does provide some weak evidence that the subjective information
that loan ocers can voluntarily add to an application le increases the willingness to lend
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among those who review the le. Yet, this eect does not dier between male and female
loan applicants.
In sum, we analyze objective credit-registry scores; subjective repayment probabilities
that loan ocers assigned during our experiment; a risk module in which loan ocers esti-
mate the amount of risk taking by a real-life entrepreneur; and the information treatments in
the second experimental round. None of these exercises returns compelling evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that gender dierences in real or perceived credit risk are a key mechanism
to explain the strong gender bias in guarantor requirements that we document.
5.2 Gender stereotypes
5.2.1 Gender stereotypes and biased guarantor requirements across sectors
We now investigate an alternative mechanism: biased beliefs due to social stereotypes
(Bohren, Imas and Rosenberg, 2019 and Bordalo et al., 2019). Recent work has shown how
decision making can be biased when women are judged in stereotypically male domains.36
Such stereotypical beliefs can result in a type of gender bias that cannot be explained by
standard models of statistical discrimination.
We rst identify the 2-digit ISIC industry of each of the 100 loan applications used in
the experiment. This gives us fourteen unique industrial sectors. Each of these we then
classify as being either a male-dominated or a female-dominated industry. To do so, we
use data from the 5th and 6th rounds of the World Bank-EBRD Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). This data set contains information on the gender
of the owner of 44,540 rms across 48 middle-income countries in Emerging Europe, Central
Asia and North Africa.37 For each industry, we measure the proportion of SMEs owned by
women and then rank all industries. We dene male-dominated (female-dominated) indus-
36For example, Guiso et al. (2008); Carrell, Page and West (2010), Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales
(2014); Bohren, Imas and Rosenberg (2019) and Carlana (2019). Alan, Ertac and Mumcu (2018) show how
traditional gender views among Turkish elementary school teachers negatively aect girls' math and verbal
test performance.
37The survey design uses a comprehensive sample frame (typically the business registry) of all formal
private-sector rms with at least ve employees. Three stratication criteria are used: sector of activity,
rm size, and geographical location. Size stratication divides the population into small (5-19 employees),
medium (20-99) and large rms (100 and more employees). Importantly, the design ensures the sample
adequately represents the sectoral and geographical distribution of each country's SME population.
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tries as those with a share of female-owned SMEs below (above) the median.38 Examples
of female-dominated sectors include the manufacturing of textiles and the manufacturing of
food products and beverages, whereas male-dominated industries include the manufacturing
of rubber and plastic products as well as the construction sector.
In the rst two columns of Table 7, we test whether the substantially (6 percentage points)
higher guarantor requirements that we observe for female loan applications on average, are
equally present in male- and female dominated sectors. In case social stereotypes play an
important role, we would expect biased guarantor requirements to be mainly or exclusively
concentrated in male-dominated sectors. This is indeed what we nd. In stereotypically male
industries, the approval of a female loan application is almost 15 percentage points more likely
to be made conditional on the presence of a guarantor (column 1). In stereotypically female
industries, on the other hand, women entrepreneurs face no such bias (the coecient is three
times smaller and not statistically signicant).39
Theory predicts that the impact of social stereotypes is most salient for loan ocers
who harbor stronger implicit gender biases. In columns 3 through 6, we therefore split
the decisions for stereotypically male sectors (columns 3-4) and for stereotypically female
sectors (columns 5-6) into those taken by loan ocers with a below median score on our
Implicit Association Test (columns 3 and 5) and those with an above-median score (columns
4 and 6). For female-dominated sectors, we do not nd a statistically signicant dierence
between more and less implicitly gender-biased loan ocers. In sharp contrast, in the case
of male-dominated industries, we nd that the higher guarantor requirements for women are
38Appendix Table A7 provides our sector breakdown and the classication into male- versus female-
dominated industries. Our results are robust to only using BEEPS data for Turkey plus other middle-income
countries along the Southeastern Mediterranean. For seven loan applications we cannot determine the typical
gender composition of the industry. Our results are robust to classifying these applications as coming from
either male or female-dominated sectors.
39When we randomize applicant gender, we create loan applications where the match between gender
and industry is by construction articial. Yet, the resulting applications reect gender-industry combina-
tions that are all observed in real life. More specically, among the 250 les from which we draw our 100
loan applications, the percentage male (female) applicants in male-dominated industries is 64 (36) percent.
These numbers are 41 and 59 percent in female industries. This shows that while men (women) are clearly
overrepresented in male-dominated (female-dominated) industries, there is sucient overlap between these
industries to create realistic experimental gender variation within both industry types. We also note that
female applicants in male industries are not more riskyin terms of credit scorethan male applicants in
such industries. In our sample of 250 les, female entrepreneurs in male industries are in fact slightly less
risky, although this dierence is not statistically signicant (p=0.30). In female industries, women have
slightly better credit scores as well (p=0.06).
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driven by loan ocers with a strong implicit gender bias. Among these ocers, there is a 27
percentage points gender dierence in the probability of a guarantor request in stereotypically
male industries. Unreported regressions show no relationship between applicant gender, on
the one hand, and subjective repayment probability in either male- or female-dominated
industries on the other hand. This again indicates that the stricter guarantor requirements
do not reect loan ocers' concerns about higher credit risk for female applicants, even
if these women apply in stereotypically male industries. Instead, our results oer strong
support in favor of social stereotypes underpinning our average treatment eects.
5.2.2 Stereotypes, industries and guarantors: Heterogeneous treatment eects
We return to the causal forest to investigate heterogeneous treatment eects across industries.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the predicted treatment eects in female-dominated
industries (dark grey bars, with the ATE indicated by the dashed vertical line) and male-
dominated industries (light grey bars and a solid line). We again observe a substantial
spread in the conditional treatment eects around the ATEs. Interestingly, both distributions
hardly overlap. Only the largest predicted treatment eects in female industries overlap with
the smallest ones in male industries. This indicates that loan ocers systematically judge
female entrepreneurs dierentlythey apply a dierent standardin male- versus female-
dominated industries.
Figure 11 depicts the relative importance of loan ocer traits as drivers of biased guaran-
tor requirements in female-dominated industries (Panel A) and male-dominated ones (Panel
B). The same traits as before play a key role: gender stereotypes (IAT score), age, and work
experience. Yet, when female entrepreneurs apply in a male-dominated industry (Panel B),
loan ocer age and experience are less important relative to their gender stereotypes, which
stands out as the main driver of biased guarantor requirements.
Figure 12 visualizes even more starkly the dierence between male- and female-dominated
industries in terms of the relationship between, on the one hand, gender stereotypes (top pan-
els), age (middle) and experience (bottom) and, on the other hand, the predicted treatment
eects across loan ocers. A rst clear dierence concerns implicit stereotypes. In female
sectors (left), individual treatment eects vary between zero and 10 percentage points, but
without an apparent relationship with ocers' stereotypes. In contrast, in male-dominated
sectors, the treatment eect is not only systematically above 10 percentage points but there
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is also a strong positive relationship between individual ocers' implicit stereotypes and
their predicted bias in guarantor requirements. This illustrates how stereotypes about fe-
male entrepreneurs can be context-dependent (Coman, 2014) and only manifest themselves
when women apply in male sectors.
Strikingly, we observe the opposite pattern for loan ocer age (middle) and work expe-
rience (bottom). The causal forest algorithm can disentangle the two and shows how both
lead to a monotonic decline in biased lending behavior in female-dominated sectors. When
loan ocers reach an age of around 43, or have almost two decades of work experience, they
typically no longer display a bias against female applicantsas long as these entrepreneurs
stick to traditionally female industries. In sharp contrast, the benecial eect of age and
experience is absent in male-dominated sectors (right). In these industries, independent
of a loan ocer's age or experience, the predicted gender bias in guarantor requirements
consistently uctuates between 10 and 15 percentage points.
6 Conclusions
We implement a randomized lab-in-the-eld experiment to gain insights into the nature of
discrimination in small business lending. While we nd no evidence of direct discrimination in
terms of unconditional approval rates, we uncover a strong gender bias in loan requirements.
All else equal, the approval of female applications is 26 percent more likely to be made
conditional on the presence of a guarantor. Exploring heterogeneity in treatment eects helps
to understand the mechanisms underpinning this indirect form of discrimination. A causal
forest algorithm reveals that specic loan ocer traitstheir implicit stereotypes about
entrepreneurial women, their work experience, and their ageindependently and strongly
correlate with the intensity of discrimination, considerably more so than their gender.
What do these results tell us about the nature of the discrimination we observe? While
we cannot rule out taste-based discrimination, we believe this is unlikely to drive the bias
in guarantor requirements. If taste-based discrimination would be of rst-order importance,
we would expect it to already rear its head in the unconditional loan approval decisions. In
contrast, our nding that discrimination is concentrated among loan ocers who adhere to
strong implicit stereotypes about entrepreneurial women is a clear sign that implicit gender
bias plays an important role. Our causal forest reveals clearly how variation in stereotypical
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thinking across the loan ocer population is the main determinant of biased guarantor
requirements. These implicit stereotypes have the strongest impact on decision making
when women apply for a loan in relatively male-dominated sectors.
We note, however, that discriminatory guarantor decisions are also concentrated among
less experienced loan ocers (even when controlling for age). Learning through experience
can mitigate statistical discrimination over time (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Altonji and Pier-
ret, 2001) and our causal forest suggests this is indeed the casebut only when female
entrepreneurs apply for loans in gender-congruent sectors. This indicates that statistical
and implicit discrimination may interact. To the extent that loan ocers with biased beliefs
do not make an eort to screen and collect information about female loan applicants in male
sectors (but continue to rely on mental shortcuts in the form of stereotypes), the accumula-
tion of work experience will not attenuate their implicit biases about women in such sectors.
In contrast, in female-dominated sectors, the intensity of discrimination declines linearly as
work experience gets accumulated.
Because biased guarantor requirements are concentrated among loans that perform well
in real life, discrimination may be costly to the bank. If creditworthy female applicants
cannot provide a guarantor, protable projects go unfunded. In equilibrium, women may
avoid applying for credit altogetheras they anticipate being asked for a personal guarantor.
Moreover, in those cases where women do manage to come up with a guarantor so as to pro-
vide additional comfort to (biased) loan ocers, there will be a cost for these entrepreneurs
themselves as they are asked to put scarce social capital on the line.
We sketch three courses of action for banks that want to mitigate gender discrimination
among loan ocers. First, our results show clearly that discrimination is less prevalent among
older and more experienced loan ocers (at least in female-dominated sectors). Adding more
senior ocers to relatively junior teams can then be a straightforward way to reduce the risk
of discriminatory lending.
Second, policies to mitigate the real-world impact of implicit biases may be called for. For
example, banks can set branch-level goals for lending to women without a guarantor and hold
those branches that do not meet this goal accountable. Successful female entrepreneurs can
also be made more visible to loan ocers, for instance by integrating them in banks' internal
communication and training programs. This holds in particular for female entrepreneurs in
stereotypically male industries. Banks can also conduct IATs with loan ocers and reveal
32
the results to those who hold implicit stereotypes. Alternatively, they can provide loan
ocers with factual information about gender discrimination in the loan ocer population
as a whole.40
Third, banks might consider replacing human with algorithmic decision-making alto-
gether. While algorithmic credit scoring can reduce face-to-face discrimination in markets
prone to implicit and explicit biases, it may fail to reduce (or even increase) disparities
between and within social groups in lending terms (Bartlett et al. 2019; Fuster et al., 2020).
We end this paper with an observation about the generalizability of our ndings. As
mentioned before, Turkey is a middle-income country with a competitive banking sector but
relatively conservative social norms. To what extent are our results portable across borders?
One way to answer this question is to identify countries that are similar to Turkey in terms
of economic and nancial development as well as gender norms.41 This yields a broad and
varied group of countries across the world, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East and North Africa; the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, and Paraguay in Latin America; Greece and Hungary in Europe; and
Cambodia and Sri Lanka in Asia. In all these countries, discrimination by (parts of the)
loan ocer population may contribute to women's nancial exclusion and, therefore, to a
misallocation of entrepreneurial talent.
40Alesina et al. (2018) test how the former intervention mitigates bias among teachers who evaluate
children. Boring and Philippe (2019) test the latter intervention among students who evaluate teachers.
41More specically, we identify the intersection of all countries within one standard deviation from Turkey
in terms of GDP per capita, domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, and the World
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
N Mean Median Sd. Min Max
Panel A: Participant characteristics
Participant is female 332 0.47 0.00 0.50 0 1
Participant experience (years) 326 8.67 8.00 5.77 0 32
Participant age (years) 321 37.30 36.00 5.84 26 53
Participant is supervisor 334 0.43 0.00 0.50 0 1
Participant risk aversion 333 4.11 4.00 1.37 1 6
Participant gender bias (IAT) 325 0.33 0.34 0.32 -0.93 1.00
Panel B: Loan-file characteristics
Real life performing 100 0.50 0.5 0.50 0 1
Real life non-performing (NPL) 100 0.25 0 0.44 0 1
Real life declined 100 0.25 0 0.44 0 1
Panel C: Decision characteristics
First round
Rejection dummy 1,336 0.39 0.00 0.49 0 1
Guarantor dummy 814 0.27 0.00 0.44 0 1
Subjective repayment probability 1,329 60.11 70.00 30.81 0 100
Second round
Rejection dummy 1,334 0.36 0.00 0.48 0 1
Guarantor dummy 860 0.27 0.00 0.44 0 1
Subjective repayment probability 1,324 61.48 70.00 30.41 0 100
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel A summarizes the
main characteristics of all participants who took part in the experiment. Panel B displays summary statistics for the 100
loan application files used in the experiment. Panel C displays summary statistics at the decision level (participant-file
combination). Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 2: Applicant gender and loan rejection
Dependent variable: Rejection dummy
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Female applicant -0.008 -0.008 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Participant is supervisor 0.062∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Participant is female 0.023 0.024 0.024
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Participant experience (years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Participant age (years) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Participant risk aversion -0.012 -0.012
(0.010) (0.010)
Participant IAT score 0.006 0.007
(0.043) (0.043)
Constant 0.395∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.022) (0.106) (0.114) (0.172)
R-squared 0.259 0.267 0.280 0.282 0.282
N 1,336 1,336 1,280 1,248 1,248
File FE 3 3 3 3 3
City FE 3 3 3 3
Participant RE 3
Notes: The dependent variable is a Rejection dummy that equals ‘1’ if the participant declines the credit application
and ‘0’ if the participant approves it. The sample is restricted to the first round of the experiment. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the participant level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent
level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 3: Applicant gender and guarantor requirements
Dependent variable: Guarantor dummy
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Female applicant 0.063∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
Participant is supervisor 0.051 0.051 0.061 0.043
(0.041) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Participant is female -0.027 -0.027 -0.018
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
Participant experience (years) 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Participant age (years) 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Participant risk aversion 0.016 0.014
(0.014) (0.015)
Participant IAT score -0.045 -0.052
(0.066) (0.069)
Constant 0.236∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.170 0.130 0.536∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.176) (0.197) (0.250)
R-squared 0.152 0.191 0.200 0.201 0.192
N 814 814 778 758 758
File FE 3 3 3 3 3
City FE 3 3 3 3
Participant RE 3
Notes: The dependent variable is a Guarantor dummy that equals ‘1’ if the participant approves the credit application
but requests a guarantor and ‘0’ if the participant approves it without requesting a guarantor. The sample is restricted
to the first round of the experiment. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the participant level.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable
definitions.
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Table 4: Applicant gender and guarantor requirements: Participant heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Guarantor dummy









[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Female applicant 0.073∗ 0.071∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.060 0.120∗∗ 0.013
(0.042) (0.043) (0.056) (0.040) (0.047) (0.042)
R-squared 0.409 0.293 0.356 0.295 0.406 0.270
N 344 414 354 404 325 433
t-test p-value 0.490 0.215 0.044









[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Female applicant 0.118∗∗∗ -0.036 0.083 0.061∗ 0.016 0.104∗∗
(0.036) (0.056) (0.077) (0.034) (0.048) (0.043)
R-squared 0.301 0.357 0.416 0.204 0.343 0.323
N 474 284 217 541 387 371
t-test p-value 0.010 0.399 0.087
File FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
City FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Participant covariates 3 3 3 3 3 3
Participant RE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes: The dependent variable is a Guarantor dummy that equals ‘1’ if the participant approves the credit application but
requests a guarantor and ‘0’ if the participant approves it without requesting a guarantor. The sample is restricted to the
first round of the experiment. When partitioning non-binary variables, the “Below median” sample corresponds to strictly
below the median while the “Above median” sample corresponds to values at the median and above. For the Participant risk
aversion variable, higher values indicate greater risk aversion so that participants with above median risk aversion are the most
risk averse. Participant gender bias measures implicit gender bias based on an implicit association test (IAT). Higher IAT
values indicate that participants associate men more with careers and women more with household tasks. The t-test p-value
corresponds to one-sided tests. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the participant level. All regressions
include the same participant covariates as in column [5] of Table 2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Availability of borrower information and gender bias
Dependent variable: Rejection dummy Guarantor dummy
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Female applicant -0.015 0.014 0.036 0.028
(0.025) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050)
No subj. 0.056 0.087∗∗ -0.039 -0.056
(0.035) (0.043) (0.048) (0.059)
No obj. -0.049 -0.037 -0.016 -0.013
(0.036) (0.046) (0.048) (0.057)
No subj. × Female applicant -0.063 0.033
(0.059) (0.074)
No obj. × Female applicant -0.024 -0.005
(0.062) (0.067)
R-squared 0.230 0.230 0.235 0.235
N 1,246 1,246 808 808
File FE 3 3 3 3
City FE 3 3 3 3
Participant covariates 3 3 3 3
Participant RE 3 3 3 3
Notes: The dependent variable in columns [1] and [2] is a Rejection dummy that equals ‘1’ if the participant
declines the credit application and ‘0’ if the participant approves it. The dependent variable in columns [3]
and [4] is a Guarantor dummy that equals ‘1’ if the participant approves the credit application but requests
a guarantor and ‘0’ if the participant approves it without requesting a guarantor. The sample is restricted to
the second round of the experiment. All regressions include the same participant covariates as in column [5] of
Table 2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the participant level. *, **, *** indicate















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Geographical distribution of participants across the bank’s regional offices
Notes: This map shows the number and gender of the participants in the eight Turkish regional bank offices that participated
in the experiment. Circle size is proportional to the number of participants. The percentage of female (male) participants is
shown in red (blue).
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−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Participant gender bias (IAT)
Male participants Female participants 95% confidence interval
Notes: This figure shows a local polynomial smooth with 95 per cent confidence intervals of the variable Participant gender bias
(IAT) for male (short dash) and female (long dash) participants, respectively. The combined two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test statistic is 0.181 and has a p-value of 0.01. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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20 40 60 80 100
Mean probability of repayment
Performing loan Non−performing loan Declined application
Notes: The x-axis shows the within-file mean, across participants, of the subjective repayment probability. The y-axis shows
the share of participants who declined the loan application. The figure is based on the first round of the experiment. Appendix
Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Male Applicant Female Applicant
Randomized gender of applicant
Performing Non−performing Declined
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of loan applications approved during the experiment and for which participants
requested a guarantor. Bars are shown for approved loans repaid in real life (dark gray), approved loans that were defaulted on
in real life (medium gray), and loan applications rejected in real life (light gray). Bars indicate applications that were shown to
participants as coming from a female (right) or male (left) entrepreneur. Whiskers indicate one binomial standard error. The
sample is restricted to the first round of the experiment. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Figure 5: Applicant gender and guarantor requirements – Heterogeneous treatment effects
Panel A: Distribution of conditional treatment effects
Panel B: Relative importance of covariates
Notes: This figure shows results from a generalized causal forest model with 20,000 trees and honest splitting (Athey, Tibshirani
and Wager, 2019). The outcome is the Guarantor dummy and the covariates are the participant characteristics in column [5]
of Table 3. Female applicant is the treatment variable. Panel A shows the distribution of the conditional treatment effects.
The black dashed line indicates the average treatment effect from the baseline model (Table 3, column [5]). Panel B shows the
variable Relative importance. This is a weighted sum of how many times a loan officer trait was used to split at each depth in
the forest when estimating treatment heterogeneity.
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Figure 6: Predicted treatment effects by implicit gender bias, age, and experience
Panel A Panel B
Panel C
Notes: Plotted points represent individual loan officers. The horizontal axis indicates implicit gender bias (IAT score, Panel
A), age (Panel B), and experience (Panel C). These are the three most important treatment moderators according to the causal
forest algorithm (cf. Figure 5, Panel B). The vertical axis in each panel indicates the conditional average treatment effect
(CATE) predicted by our causal forest. The lines display the local smoothed polynomial relationship between the loan officer
trait and the CATE. The treatment effects are predicted by feeding our test sample (30% of the full sample) through the trees
grown by the causal forest algorithm on the basis of the splitting sample (70% of the full sample).
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the variable Credit score for loan application files that were male (left) and female
(right) in real life. Credit scores are from the KKB credit registry and higher scores indicate lower credit risk. The figure is
based on the 250 loan application files from which the 100 files used in the experiment were drawn. The combined two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is 0.168 and has a p-value of 0.087. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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600 800 1000 1200 1400
Credit score
Male applicant Female applicant
Notes: This figure shows binned scatter plots for male applicants (dark grey dots) and female applicants (light grey diamonds)
using robust pointwise confidence intervals. The data reflect all decisions in the first round of the experiment. The number of
bins is not pre-determined but data driven and the integrated mean squared errors are minimized. The confidence intervals
are at the 95% level and based on a cubic B-spline regression estimate of subjective repayment probability on the credit score.
Credit scores are provided by the KKB credit registry and higher scores indicate lower credit risk. Appendix Table A1 contains
all variable definitions.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Subjective repayment probability
Male applicant Female applicant
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density curves of the variable Subjective repayment probability for loan applications that
were presented as male (black short dash) and female (gray long dash), respectively. The figure is based on the 1,329 decisions
made in the first round of the experiment. The combined two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is 0.404 and has a
p-value of 0.649. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Figure 10: Conditional treatment effects in male- versus female-dominated sectors
Notes: This figure shows results from two separate generalized causal forest models each with 20,000 trees and honest splitting
(Athey, Tibshirani and Wager, 2019). The outcome is the Guarantor dummy and the covariates are the participant character-
istics in column [5] of Table 3. Female applicant is the treatment variable. The dark (light) grey bars show the distribution of
the conditional treatment effects for female (male) dominated sectors. The dashed (solid) line indicates the average treatment
effect from the baseline model for female (male) dominated sectors as in Table 7, column [2] (Table 7, column [1]).
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Figure 11: Heterogeneous treatment effects - Relative importance of covariates
Panel A
Panel B
Notes: This figure shows results from two separate generalized causal forest models each with 20,000 trees and honest splitting
(Athey, Tibshirani and Wager, 2019). The outcome is the Guarantor dummy and the covariates are the participant charac-
teristics in column [5] of Table 3. The horizontal axes of Panels A and B show the variable Relative importance. This is a
weighted sum of how many times a loan officer trait was used to split at each depth in the forest when estimating treatment
heterogeneity in female-dominated sectors (Panel A) or male-dominated sectors (Panel B).
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Figure 12: Predicted treatment effects across sectors, by implicit bias, age, and experience
Notes: Plotted points represent individual loan officers. The horizontal axis indicates implicit gender bias (IAT score, top),
age (middle), and experience (bottom). These are the three most important treatment moderators according to the causal
forest algorithm (cf. Figure 11). The vertical axis in each panel indicates the conditional average treatment effects (CATE)
predicted by our causal forest. The lines display the local smoothed polynomial relationship between the loan officer trait and
the CATE. The treatment effects are predicted for female (male) dominated sectors by feeding our test sample (30% of the
sample corresponding to female (male) dominated sectors) through the trees grown by the causal forest algorithm on the basis
of the splitting sample (70% of the sample corresponding to female (male) dominated sectors).
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Appendices
Table A1: Variable definitions
Panel A: Participant characteristics
Participant is female Dummy variable equal to 1 for female and 0 for male participants.
Participant experience (years) Number of years the participant has been an employee of any
bank’s credit division.
Participant age (years) Age of the participant in years.
Participant is supervisor Dummy variable equal to 1 for participants who are a supervi-
sor/branch manager, 0 for those who are a loan officer.
Participant risk aversion Integer variable ranging from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating risk loving
and 6 indicating the highest level of risk aversion.
Participant gender bias (IAT) Takes values from -1 to 1. Positive (negative) values indicate
that the participant associates careers and entrepreneurship with
being male (female). A score of zero indicates no implicit gender
bias.
Panel B: File characteristics
Female applicant Dummy variable equal to 1 if the randomized gender of the loan
application is female and 0 otherwise.
Female applicant (original) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of the real-life loan ap-
plication was originally female and 0 otherwise.
Real life performing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was performing in real life,
0 otherwise.
Real life NPL Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan was non-performing in real
life, 0 otherwise.
Real life declined Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan application was declined
by the lending staff in real life, 0 otherwise.
Micro Dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit file was from a micro firm
and 0 if the credit file was from an SME firm.
Log of credit demanded Logarithm of the amount of credit requested by the applicant.
Credit score Credit score as taken from the KKB credit registry. Higher values
indicate less ex ante credit risk.
Table A1 continued on next page
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Table A1 continued
Male-dominated sector Dummy variable equal to 1 if the share of firms with majority
female ownership, in a given industry, is less than or equal to the
median industry share; 0 otherwise. The share of female-owned
firms is calculated at the 2-digit ISIC level using pooled observa-
tions from the EBRD–World Bank BEEPS V and VI surveys.
Female-dominated sector Dummy variable equal to 1 if the share of firms with majority
female ownership, in a given industry, is greater than the median
industry share; 0 otherwise. The share of female-owned firms is
calculated at the 2-digit ISIC level using pooled observations from
the EBRD–World Bank BEEPS V and VI surveys.
Panel C: Decision characteristics
Rejection dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant rejects the loan
application, 0 otherwise.
Guarantor dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant offers credit con-
ditional on the presence of a guarantor and 0 if the participant
offers credit but does not request a guarantor.
Subjective repayment probability Continuous variable which takes values from 0 to 100. For each
decision, the participant estimates the likelihood that the loan
would be repaid. Higher values indicate a greater chance of re-
payment.
Panel D: Treatment characteristics
No subj. Dummy variable equal to 1 if information subjectively provided by
lending staff is removed from the loan application file, 0 otherwise.
No obj. Dummy variable equal to 1 if objective information (the credit




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Predictors of participant gender bias
Dependent variable: Participant gender bias (IAT)
[1]
Participant is female 0.114∗∗∗
(0.036)
Participant experience (years) 0.006
(0.004)
Participant age (years) -0.001
(0.004)
Participant is supervisor 0.045
(0.044)






Notes: The dependent variable is Participant gender bias (IAT)
which takes values from -1 to 1. Positive (negative) values indi-
cate that the participant associates careers and entrepreneurship
with being male (female). A score of zero indicates no implicit
gender bias. The sample is restricted to the first round round of
the experiment. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** in-
dicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table A4: Applicant gender and credit score
Dependent variable: Credit score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Female applicant (original) -12.845 51.042 59.297 66.736 79.874
(49.441) (67.354) (67.639) (67.332) (67.102)
Micro -136.459* -39.468
(70.387) (96.173)
Log of credit demand 68.671*
(36.547)
Constant 1,035.730*** 1,065.000*** 964.336*** 1,115.907*** 299.568
(29.942) (0.000) (138.865) (158.469) (486.487)
Sector FE 3 3 3 3
Region FE 3 3 3
R-squared 0.000 0.212 0.233 0.250 0.273
N 243 243 243 243 243
Notes: The dependent variable is Credit score as provided by the KKB credit registry. Higher values indicate less ex
ante credit risk. The sample includes the 250 loan files from which the 100 loan files used in the experiment were drawn.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table A5: Applicant gender and subjective repayment probability
Dependent variable: Subjective repayment probability (%)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Female applicant 0.553 0.535 1.187 0.873 0.921
(1.399) (1.403) (1.423) (1.457) (1.450)
Participant is supervisor -1.813 -3.300 -3.059 -3.178
(1.882) (2.409) (2.442) (2.456)
Participant is female -2.138 -2.322 -2.349
(1.819) (1.910) (1.921)
Participant experience (years) 0.012 0.023 0.016
(0.198) (0.203) (0.205)
Participant age (years) 0.218 0.132 0.130
(0.247) (0.246) (0.248)
Participant risk aversion -0.506 -0.480
(0.661) (0.663)
Participant IAT score 1.711 1.605
(2.772) (2.804)
Constant 59.835∗∗∗ 60.612∗∗∗ 53.525∗∗∗ 58.041∗∗∗ 61.390∗∗∗
(1.149) (1.441) (8.169) (8.295) (12.432)
R-squared 0.268 0.277 0.288 0.290 0.289
N 1,329 1,329 1,273 1,243 1,243
File FE 3 3 3 3 3
City FE 3 3 3 3
Participant RE 3
Notes: The dependent variable is Subjective repayment probability which ranges between 0 and 100. The sample
is restricted to the first round of the experiment. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the
participant level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, respectively. Appendix Table
A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table A6: Gender of the entrepreneur and loan officers’ risk perceptions
Dependent variable: Project risk the loan officer expects the entrepreneur to choose
Loan officer’s perception of:
Entrepreneur’s risk choice Entrepreneur’s risk choice
with credit
[1] [2]
Female entrepreneur -0.229** -0.157
(0.115) (0.115)
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.006
N 333 333
Notes: This table uses data from a separate experimental module in which participants were randomly
matched with a (real-life) entrepreneur. Participants were informed about the gender, age, and sector
of the entrepreneur they had been matched with. Prior to the experimental sessions, the entrepreneurs
had been asked to pick one out of six entrepreneurial bets that were increasing in riskiness, in the spirit
of Eckel and Grossman (2008). They were asked to do so once for a project they would finance with
a loan and once for a project financed without debt. During the experiment, loan officers were then
asked to guess which risky bet they thought their matched entrepreneur had chosen. They were paid if
they guessed correctly. The ordered probit specifications in columns [1] and [2], regress the participant’s
perceptions of their matched entrepreneur’s risk taking (on a 1-6 scale) on the gender of the entrepreneur
for a project funded without and with credit, respectively. Both specifications control for the two other
known traits of the matched entrepreneur (age and sector).
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15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 1 2 25 27
17 Manufacture of textiles 1 5 64 63
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 1 7 89 91
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 0 1 14 12
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0 1 16 14
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere
classified
0 1 14 12
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere
classified
1 3 37 36
45 Construction 0 1 13 13
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motor-
cycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
0 5 62 63
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor
vehicles and motorcycles
0 14 189 189
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; re-
pair of personal and household goods
1 36 484 476
55 Hotels and restaurants 1 8 105 116
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 1 6 78 79
93 Other service activities 0 3 41 40
Unable to classify 7 105 103
Notes: This table shows, for the 2-digit ISIC codes of the 100 files used in the experiment, whether the sector is classified as being a
Female-dominated sector, the number of files in each 2-digit sector, and the number of decisions made during the experiment based on
the files of each 2-digit sector. Female-dominated sectors are defined by the share of firms with majority female ownership at the 2-digit
ISIC industry level using data from the EBRD–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) V
and VI.
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Figure A1: Indirect gender discrimination: Heterogeneity
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Notes: This figure shows estimated coefficients for Female applicant using the same specification as in column [5] of Table 3.
Each dot reflects the coefficient based on the full sample minus the observations from the indicated city, province, or industry
in Panel A, B and C, respectively. The dependent variable is a Guarantor dummy which equals ‘1’ if the participant approved
the credit application but requests a guarantor and ‘0’ if the participant approved it without requesting a guarantor. The
sample is restricted to the first round of the experiment. The horizontal lines reflect 90% level confidence intervals. In Panel
A, the coefficients are ordered from highest (top) to lowest (bottom) regional household disposable income in 2016. Household
disposable income is the total of disposable household income divided by household size and comes from the Turkish Statistical
Institute’s “Income and Living Conditions Survey Regional Results”. In Panel B, the coefficients are ordered from highest (top)
to lowest (bottom) regional income level per capita in 2016. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.67
Figure A2: Heterogeneous guarantor requirements: Fully interacted models
Notes: This figure shows coefficients from linear fully interacted models where the dependent variable is a Guarantor dummy
that equals ‘1’ if the participant approves the application but requests a guarantor and ‘0’ if the participant approves without
a guarantor. The sample is restricted to the first round of the experiment. Each bar corresponds to coefficients from a separate
regression where we regress the Guarantor dummy on Female applicant, a given Participant characteristic interacted with
Female applicant and the given Participant characteristic interacted with all other controls in column [5] of Table 3 including
the file and city fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level, respectively, and refer to t-tests
of the null that (Female applicant + Female applicant×Participant characteristic)=0. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable
definitions.
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Male Applicant Female Applicant
Randomized gender of applicant
At least median expected repayment probablity


































Male Applicant Female Applicant
Randomized gender of applicant
Highest tercile KKB credit score (lowest credit risk)
Middle tercile KKB credit score (medium credit risk)
Lowest tercile KKB credit score (highest credit risk)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of loan applications that were approved during the experiment and for which participants
requested a guarantor. Panel A: bars indicate applications to which participants assigned a repayment probability at/above the
median (dark gray) or below the median (light gray). Panel B: bars indicate loan applications with a KKB credit score in the
highest tercile (lowest credit risk, dark gray); middle tercile (medium credit risk, medium gray); or lowest tercile (highest credit
risk, light gray). Whiskers indicate one binomial standard error. The sample is restricted to the first round of the experiment.
Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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